



**UKRAINA DYPLOMATYCHNA  
(Diplomatic Ukraine)**

SCIENTIFIC YEARBOOK

*The tenth issue*

**Compilers:**

*Leonid Gubersky, Pavlo Krivonos,  
Boris Gumenyuk, Anatoly Denisenko*

**Kyiv • 2009**



## **Pavlo Hai-Nyzhnyk**

*Born on May 28, 1971 in Dunaivtsi (Khmelnitsk region). PhD (History) — 2000, Doctor of History — 2008. Senior Research Worker of the I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine*

### **MATTER OF “DEICH LUFT REEDERAI”**

**O**n What Terms Government of the UNR Took Money From Germany

In the article below we will examine some of the unexplored by historians aspects of the UNR (Ukrainian People's

Republic) activities in the times of the Directorate — (this name derives from command, control, drive, direct, govern, manage, move or in other words — that was a form of government). These activities include that Financial Agency in Germany which helps us understand several direction of the Ukrainian governmental policy — financial, foreign and the organization of work in the public service.

We should note that Financial Agency had extraordinary plenary powers concerning labour in Europe. This was a government agency in Germany empowered to use the Ukraine's public money abroad for various financial purposes such as providing financial support to the Ukrainian diplomatic mission and various representative offices; Often referred to as “Financial Secret Service”.

This agency controlled nearly all foreign accounts and currency of the UNR and wide leverage as for their use abroad, and of financing of the Ukrainian missions, representative offices.

One of many areas of work of the FSS in Berlin was the task of sending the Ukrainian currency, created in the year of 1918 by the Ukrainian government for printing in the German state printing-house of “Reichsdrukerei”, by the order of the Directorate. The so-

called matter of “Deich Luft Reederai” arose due to this activity by the FSS during a test of its activity by the Investigative Committee which arrived in Germany in 1920. A revision of this account is interesting not only because the conclusions show the activity of the FSS in Europe, but also clearly reflect the moral values of civil servants of the UNR at different stages and the hierarchy of public authorities at the time of Directorate.

Before addressing these issues it is necessary to remind one that the Investigative Committee headed by Skoropys-Joltuhovskij, was appointed after the order of Minister of Finance Martos on the 16th of December, 1919. While too little too late, the chairman of the FSS in Germany, Grygory Suprun did not allow any changes. At this time, the Minister of Finance did not want to dampen the relationship with the FSS and neither government officials nor the Directors took any harsh actions toward one another. However, Suprun, without having complete powers, halted payments to the Ukrainian missions and embassies abroad. The FSS also, despite the categorical requirements of Minister of Finance, failed to report to these activities to the government of UNR.

In the end The Minister of Finance (from March 31, 1920), ratified a Directorate on the 8th of April, 1920 dismissing Suprun from his position on the 29th of March, 1920 for non-fulfilment of orders and abuse of the civic powers given to him. Moreover Suprun refused the transfer funds and property to his newly-appointed replacement Iv. Myrayi, who, commented that “Suprun does not acknowledge the government represented by Martos”<sup>1</sup>. Simultaneously, many government officials stopped working in the Secret Service. Only through the German court and personal guarantees to Suprun from the Ukrainian government, was it allowed to begin verification of activity of the FSS in Germany, which was accompanied with the concealment of documents, sabotage and mockery from Ukrainian power.

The matter called “Deich Luft Reederai” appeared during the work of the Investigative Committee and became one of many episodes from the row of loud abuses, corruption, and moral degradation of considerable layers of higher governmental officials and government workers of the Directorate. At this time the Ukrainian army had conducted a victorious fight for the rights of the people to have their own country.

In early January of 1919, the Ukrainian government enjoyed its last days in Kyiv. While Mazepa recalled, "it is funny that the different Ukrainian missions were formed abroad"<sup>2</sup>. One of these missions was a FSS of Ministry of Finance. This mission formed in January 1919, headed by the former director of credit office of the Ministry of Finance, Suprun. It was initially planned that a financial agent would work in Berlin, Paris and London<sup>3</sup>, but because of the political circumstances the FSS and Chairman set up offices in the capital of Germany. In December 1919, the Ukrainian FSS in Berlin had 14 official governmental officials, three "employees" and two hired governmental officials<sup>4</sup>.

At this time the Minister of Finance, Martos recalled this occasion, saying "...even as in Kyiv, it was difficult to organize the printing of money in a sufficient amount". While he reminisced over this humorous antidote he sent the appointed financial agent, Suprun, abroad for the purpose of organizing the delivery of money from the Berlin printing-house. This task came with great expense<sup>5</sup>. The issue of the cost of this operation and the evidence of these on goings which could have been observed from Berlin must be explored. As well as the nature of the facilities in which these activities took place.

Ukrainian currency was printed in Germany on the order of the offices of Central Advice and Hetman Skoropadskyj. Former chairman of the Council of People's Ministers was aware that in the state printing house of Germany sat approximately 10 billion Hryvnias. At this time "our financial state was more difficult, because monetary reserves, taken by the Directorate from Kyiv, were spent by previous administrations on those legendary forming of different Hetamans..."<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile with arrival of the Galichina army general, the necessities had doubled."<sup>7</sup>

Also during this period the chairman of the FSS and the Ministry of Finance, Suprun, according to Martos, was sent from Germany to Ukraine "transporting a whole carriage of the prepared currency and various printing equipment, but Poland seized Kholmschinu, and the carriage went back to Berlin"<sup>8</sup>. Immediately following this incident (Martos does not specify the date), he, through the special courier, (Khomyak), ordered Suprun to organize delivery of the Ukrainian money via plane, and through a second courier, (Scnar) he gave an order to accelerate this business. Martos writes that Suprun made an agreement with "Lufthansa",

in Germany, to purchase large bomber-airplanes.<sup>9</sup> However, late historians have found errors with this historical account which were later migrated to all historiography of revolutionary period of Ukrainian history.

As the archived documents reveals an agreement concerning the delivery of the Ukrainian money to the government of UNR. (namely “Appendix of the Investigative Committee to the Minister of Finance on the business of revision of FSS in Germany, under the management of Suprun, from the 1st of February, 1919 to the 30th of April, 1920”), It was concluded not from “Lufthansa”, but with “Deich Luft Reederai” and it was done, with the certification of the financial agent Suprun, by proposal of the Foreign Germany Ministry. The negotiations with “Deich Luft Reederai” on behalf of the FSS of Ministry of finance of UNR were controlled directly by financial agent Suprun, and were conducted by Gershun. The representatives of the state control in the UNR were Vronskiy and Aristarkhiv who were controlled by Suprun. The agreement was concluded on April 4, 1919.<sup>10</sup> According to the agreement, the DLR was responsible for transporting of 20,000 kg. of Ukrainian currency to Stanislaviv. The Ukrainian FSS was to pay (to the society of “DLR”) one kilogram of Ukrainian banknotes for every 40 German marks.

Ukraine also allocated 750,000 marks for the organization and purchase of airplanes. Moreover, “because, the situation was very uncertain”, the DLR required the transit of 2 million, 500 mark notes to the bank, in Ukraine, “...as the price for the timely and correct calculations for the transportation of cargo”.<sup>11</sup> The transport of Ukrainian money began 14 days after the agreement had been concluded. Thus 2000 kg. of cargo was transported every week. On occasions when this amount of cargo was above the agreed amount, the following scale of bonuses was implemented:

4-th	week as a transportation of more than 2000 kg							-100%
5-the	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	-100%
6-the	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	- 80%
7-the	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	- 60%

Simultaneously the Investigative Committee of the Minister of Finances headed by I. Miry (who later would be replaced by E. Sokovych), arrived from Ukraine to Berlin and discovered a number of circumstances:

Despite the terms of the agreement to make payment in marks it was Austrian Crowns that were used instead.

On May 12, 1919 the DLR issued a requirement to go back to payment again in marks “as the Crowns currency wasn’t stable”.

Gershun, on behalf of the FSS, gave his consent to call on the DLR and ordered airplane fuel to be delivered from Kam’yanets-Podil’skyi.<sup>12</sup> Meanwhile discussions soon began about the diminishing terms of the agreement regarding the transportation of currency.

Soon after, the terms of agreement were revised and on May 17th the DLR declared that additional transport flights would begin as soon as the Ukrainian representatives delivered 3,250,000 mark notes to the “National’ bank of Germany”. On May 21<sup>st</sup>, the Germans reported to the FSS, that they had formed an agreement with the bank “Herman” in Breslau concerning the lease of a “Trezor Raum” (a vault) in order to store the Ukrainian money, which would cost 5 thousand marks monthly. On May 28<sup>th</sup>, the DLR was scheduled to address the FSS and discuss the insurance policy which, the DLR purchased for the previously mentioned air planes

On June 2, 1919, the DLR sent a notarized certificate from the Reichdrukerei to Ukraine, regarding the delivery of 233 boxes of Ukrainian currency reminding the UNR that the time is passing and the promise to pay the DLR losses no matter what happens is still in force. Correspondence was later recovered that claimed that the operation has cost over 1,500 marks per day. On June 4<sup>th</sup> the Ukrainians were informed of the airplane bought by the Germans for 15.000 marks. A bill for this exact amount was later sent to the FSS. To be paid by the DLR.

According to a letter dated June 6, 1919, the Germans agreed to change the destination of the planes from Stanislaviv to Kam’yanec’-Podil’skiy, on the condition that they would receive a 10% increase in compensation. In this letter the DLR addresses the question of whether or not to insure its airplanes. On June 26, 1919 “Deich Backlash of Reederai” sends the Ukrainian financial agent two letters, where he arranges the flights to begin on June 21, of that year. However another letter suggests the dates of the flights to begin much later. This completely violated the agreement, where it was expressly and noted that the terms of flights were to begin two weeks after of payment was received. The representatives of

FSS, with Suprun at the head, made concessions (that were unprofitable for the Ukrainian treasury) to the correction of the terms of agreement of the money transport.

On the day of the meeting, the representatives of the FSS (Gershun, Wronski and Aristarkhiv) agreed to pay 60,000 marks on the condition, that it matched the same amount approved by financial agent Suprun<sup>13</sup>.

It was planned by Germany, that “Deich Backlash of Reedrai” in 1919, would transport 12,000 tons of Ukrainian currency to Ukraine between October, and November of that year. The Germans considered the continuation of the flights to be impossible. On August 23, the DLR offered the FSS, for the sake of accelerating the transportation of money, to purchase six large airplanes, for 720,000 marks. This suggestion was accepted by the Ukrainians.

Afterwards the German contractors proposed a new agreement, where changes were made to some of the financial details. The DLR required additional deposits; in accordance with an initial agreement it was to have transported 20,000 kg., per load. However, if such an amount wasn’t transported, the Ukrainian FSS was to recover the losses.

Representatives of UNR, Wronsky, Gershun and Aristarkhiv (Suprun was not in Berlin at this time) accepted 20,000 marks per week, to prevent the DLR from disbanding his organization (actually it was additionally prepaid for a segment from December 1 – 31, 1919). Suprun, who had gone back to Berlin and reported to the DLR, on December 12, that the shipment of currency being sent to Ukraine was stopped and would not be continued. The Germans protested claiming that the agreement must be honoured; that less than 20,000 kg. was being transported and that the cancellation and transporting of money had dismissed the organization and nullified any official claims of the government of the UNR.

About 2 million marks were required “for the harm during transportation” and additional compensation of losses “that DLR earned when it didn’t transport all the amounts it had to”.<sup>14</sup> No one understood neither why the FSS made weekly payments to the DLR during December 1919, nor why the price was 20,000 marks a week, when according to the letters of Deich Backlash of Reederai one day of organization usually cost 1 thousand 500 marks. (that would make 10,500 marks a week).

It was for this incident that the legal adviser of the FSS, Gershun, demanded that Ukrainians should satisfy some DLR requirements.

The most difficult question for the UNR was the compensation for the cost of an airplane taken hostage in Romania (we shall comment on this later). Other claims were considered by him or exaggerated, or unproven. The solicitations of the DLR were satisfied with an ordinary order by the decision of the legal adviser, Gershun (who received a salary of 250,000 thousand marks). The FSS also hired Tikhtin and Heine, who in their study came to the conclusion, that the position of the Ukrainian legal adviser had been honoured. On the basis of the afore-mentioned analyses of the legal adviser Gershun, the representative of State control, Wronski, reported to the DLR, that the FSS in Berlin considered claims of this organization to be exaggerated and groundless. After that there were a number of meetings and negotiations, which failed to yield any positive results. At the end of March in 1920 everything stopped.

At the same time, the main complaint about the DLR was not appealed. The main issue was the transportation of 20,000 kg of currency that was indeed agreed upon. However, it was determined that the agreed schedule of these flights was not honoured by the Germans. The head of the Ukrainian Investigative Committee Sokovych, noted that "These two very important factors relied, somehow, on the second plan, and the gross weight being confused with the net weight of the load. Neither the representatives of state control, nor legal adviser Gershun paid any attention to the exact amount of the load. The money was paid to the DLR as it had already been their responsibility to transport the load quickly".<sup>15</sup> There were approximately 200 boxes of Ukrainian currency that was en route to the Trezor Raum in Breslau, due to arrive in November, 1920.

Two interesting observations can be made in respect to payment and delivery of funds. Firstly, the flights were to begin two weeks after delivery of the money to the National Bank of Germany. (The first flight was carried out only on June 20, 1919.) Secondly the Ukrainian money must be transported within a two month period. The representatives of the FSS, for some reasons did not adhere to these concrete terms following the round of talks with the DLR. Nor did anyone insist on the implementation of the agreed terms.



Even worse concessions were made, requiring Germany's treasury to incur additional losses.

There were other activities and payments to the FSS. For example, the first flight between Kam'yanec'-Podil'skyi to Germany, cost 33,000 for 760 kg of cargo (the contract required the German DLR to pay half of the total shipping cost).<sup>16</sup> However, the pre-paid sum included a 100% bonus. This strange financial generosity on the part of the FSS continually and groundlessly paid for these shipments.

It is also possible that the groundless payments, the illicit purchase of airplanes and the unscrupulous activities of the representatives of the FSS should have been exposed by the Investigative Committee of Ministry of finance. It is clear that the price the FSS paid for airplanes was too high. It is possible that somebody instructed the FSS to procure air planes for 60,000 marks and those instructions were simply ignored by the Ukrainian representatives. In the end they procured the plane for 120,000 marks.<sup>17</sup> The Ukrainian FSS purchased air planes for the DLR for 1,470,000 marks<sup>18</sup>.

It's beyond comprehension why a person such as Radke, who was hired by the members of FSS, as an expert in airplanes, had no understanding of their value. It was his responsibility to examine the machines, yet he continually contacted German technical specialists in Berlin as well as other scientists for advice. Radke, overpaid for the airplanes and utilized the resources of the state facilities.<sup>19</sup> It is ironic that after following Radke's advice, on the value of airplanes, that Radke then recommended that the FSS to repair the engines of four of the airplanes, which cost 86,000 marks.<sup>20</sup> The FSS followed his instructions as they had previously.

The investigative committee noted that "there was a large amount of money and that the state could depend on timely delivery of these funds. The transport of which was conducted most languidly".<sup>21</sup> One must ask how it is possible that this project was presented to the FSS on April 14, 1919 and that the first flight to Ukraine took place on June 20, 1919? In accordance with the agreement, the shipment to Ukraine must have begun after the payment of 3 million marks had been completed. According to Suprun, it was due to a lack of funds, that the FSS was not able to carry out these instructions. The investigative committee claims that such

statements made by Suprun were not true. It was discovered that on February 3, 1919, Suprun had received 8 million marks.

From these funds he could have made payment, as the contract required, with the DLR, through The National Bank of Deutschland. The brothers Rabinovich could have completed the transaction, with funds from the purchase and sale of tea. One package of these securities was sent to Holland. The other failed to arrive. On May 4, the bank turned to Suprun for the missing funds. Another incident occurred on May 4, 1919. Suprun gave the brothers Rabinovich, 2.3 million marks in cash.<sup>22</sup> This missing transaction is worthy of a separate investigation of Suprun's activities while in Berlin.

In another transaction, funds totalling 3.2 million marks were brought to The National Bank of Germany in early May, 1919. Thus the terms of the agreement were not designed by the DLR. The Ukrainian Treasury again suffered severe financial losses which could not be avoided. There was little discussion in regards to the funds and the army and government of UNR in Ukraine.

It was confirmed by the Ukrainians that heavy German bombers such as R-69, R-70 and R-71, were developed by the organization known as "Zeppelin-Staaken". These were the largest battle air planes in the period after the First World War. The width of overhead wing measured 4.6 meters; lower wing 3.6 meters, the wing span was 42.2 meters. The length was 22.1 meters. The speed of flight was approximately 135 km per hour. In Air they were sustained by five powerful engines; Either the "Maybach" Mb.IVa 300hp, or the Mercedes DIVa 260 hp.-180 kW. Four were located in tandem wings, and the fifth in the nose of plane. Due to the high power-saving design these air planes-giants could carry a fantastic load (for the time period) over 4 tones. Other air planes, such as the Russian "Il'ya Muromets" sustained approximately 500 kilograms of weight. The best English and French bombers could haul just over one ton. The distance of flight with a standard cargo is estimated at 800 km. The crew size was 7 but it took 42 people to get it out of the hanger. The armament capability was four to six Parabellum machine guns." During war time such air planes, other than "Shtaaken", were assembled at "Auto mobile and Aviatic AG" (Leipzig), and "Luftshiffbau Shyute — Lyants" (Giessen) This plane was the first airplane to fly from Germany to Ukraine on June 20, 1919 and brought to Kam'yanets-Podil'skyi 760 kg of cur-

rency for the amount of 33,000 marks by the FSS.<sup>23</sup> Former chief of the department of the overseas press of the general staff of army of the UNR, Makogon, had previously escaped to Poland and on November 26, 1919 gave Denikin's soldiers a white-paper about the officers of the Ukrainian army. He reported that the Berlin to Ukraine flights were being completed in good time. He once remarked that he had sent the Tsar's roubles (80 million-on October 5, 1919).<sup>24</sup> But he was mistaken as those funds were sent by the ambassador of the UNR and Porsh in Germany. These activities were influenced by the FSS in Berlin. Makogon wrote that funds had been transported by enormous vehicles, "Murometc". As mentioned previously these were airplanes, (model: R-69", "R-70" and "R-71). Martos had once remarked that three five-engine airplanes were used for transportation and two, three engine planes, "but all of them have been well used."<sup>25</sup>

Four planes were in need of repair shortly after being purchased. Martos explained that the air planes quickly deteriorate, "sometimes it was possible to repair them by our own efforts but an airplane requires more frequent maintenance than other transport equipment."<sup>26</sup> Because of such mechanical needs, aircraft did not exist without multiple failures and accidents during flights.

On October 8, one such air plane had already returned from Ambulants-Podil'skyi and crashed while flying over Poland. In another instance, Makogon testified that on October 25, 1919, near Krakov, The Polish shot down a plane "for fun". All passengers and crew perished and the cost of the plane had to be refunded by the Ukrainian government. The senior pilot of another plane, a German officer, returning from Kam'yants-Podil'sky, to Berlin, did not have the permission of the Ukrainian government. He was planning to bring passengers to Vienna, where his air plane was seized by authorities. Another air plane was forced to land in Galichina because of some problems with the engine while en route to Kam'yanets.<sup>27</sup> On August 2, 1919, not far from Poland, (in the district of Poznan) without any explanations another airplane caught fire and crashed while flying over Germany (near a fence surrounding the village of Ratibor). All passengers, including the first state secretary of military affairs of ZUNR (West Ukrainian People Republic) perished. Also on the flight was, Vitovskiy, who was later buried in Berlin (in 2002 he was later reburied in Lviv).

This incident justifies an investigation. According to the notes of Chykalenko's diary, Verstyuk and Boiko were mistaken, when they specified that Vitovskiy perished on July 8, 1919, in an air crash. This error was later repeated in other accounts as well.<sup>28</sup> However, this does not answer the question of the accuracy of the report submitted by Makogon. That report asserted that the airplane's failure had taken place on September 7, 1919.<sup>29</sup> It appears that the actual date was August 4, 1919, which is commonly referred to by present historians.<sup>30</sup>

According to the investigation conducted by The Ukrainian Inspection Committee in Germany, two planes ("R-70" and "R-71") were going to take-off with currency from Breslau to Kamianets-Podilskyi on August 2, 1919 at 3:30 a.m. The first plane ("R-70") carried a passenger named Bachinskyi. The other plane ("R-71"), which Vitovskiy wanted to use for his flight didn't take-off because of motor failure which the crew failed to repair. On this day another plane took-off with Vitovskiy on board, from Breslau at approximately 10:00 a.m. According to the Fogt's report, which contained information on the transfer of money, that airplane took-off at 10:00 a.m., (because of these mechanical problems).<sup>31</sup>

The official report was written by the Inspection Committee in Berlin for the UNR government. As the plane didn't make any maintenance stops, it could have undergone an accident at the border of, then, Germany and Poland on August 2, 1919. Thus, this date is considered to be the date of Vitovskiy's death\*. Later on, according to the conversations and gossip of many, a Polish plane attacked his airplane and destroyed it.<sup>32</sup> This version of events is likely to be untrue as it is likely that the plane had crashed due to engine failure. Vitovskiy was buried in a cemetery in Berlin on August 14, 1919.

On August, 24 an airplane, model, "R-71" had suffered an accident and crashed in the city of Radom. The funds on board were destroyed.<sup>33</sup> Another plane which transported currency for the Ukrainian government didn't fly over Galicia but over Bukovina

---

\* After funerals D. Vitovskogo, In Berlin at hotel "Edem" restaurant there was a memory supper on which there were 20 persons. We will mark that the dishes, flowers, liqueurs, fruit and cigarettes, booked for a supper were prepaid due to FSS of UNR in Berlin (5 thousand 558 marks of 35 pf.) [Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie. — Сркп. 23 XXIV-10 (17). — К. 104].



and couldn't make a distance of only 10 km. The cause of the crash is attributed to the failure of all five engines. The cars from the Ukrainian side of the Dnister were directed to the other side of the river. Romanian soldiers reached it first and made threats with the weapons they confiscated from the German pilots. A Ukrainian official reported that an airplane containing currency (300 million UAH) was confiscated.<sup>34</sup> No measures of the Ukrainian mission in Bucharest were successful. Mazepa explains the actions of the Romanians did not have the any congruence with Germany. It was later discovered that the 300 million marks were transported and eventually passed on to a Ukrainian representative.<sup>35</sup>

In total the minister financed several flights from Breslau to Kam'yants-Podil'skyi totalling 18. The total amount of currency transported between the summer and autumn of 1919\*, was equal to 242,140,000 Hryvnias<sup>36</sup> which, exceeded the governmental and military need. These facts refute the claim of Martos, that only a few airplanes containing currency few flights to Ukraine.<sup>37</sup> Thus, it should be noted that Minister the of Finance, and afterwards the chairman of Council of the Council of People's Ministers of UNR,

---

\* Considerable part of cargo (it is more than 200 boxes) nevertheless have not been transported and was in Breslau till November, 1920 (Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie. — Скр. 23 XXIV-10 (17). — К. 28 3В.).

could not have known that more than 10 flights (instead of a few) were completed. Nor, could they have known about the numerous criticisms of his financial policies. Martos obviously aimed to justify his own ineffective policies and abused his role.

The governmental investigative committee, focused their attention on the FSS in Berlin, taking into account the aforementioned facts of 1921 and reached the following conclusions in relation to the “matter of “Deich Luft Reederai”. Firstly, Suprun was in a position to transfer funds to the ill-timed delivery of money to Ukraine. Instead he purchased security shares from the Brothers Rabinovich. In time, the money of the DLR would be delivered to Ukraine, though with serve financial loss, due in part to the DLR imposing more strict terms.

Another issue was that representative of the FSS, legal adviser, Gershun as well as the representatives of state control, Vronskiy and Aristarkhiv, did not protect interests of the State. They were under the thumb of the DLR whose business dealings consisted of illegal actions, changes in terms of agreements and terms of contracts, none of which benefited Ukraine”.<sup>38</sup>

The Auditing Committee was not destined to carry out the investigation and bring it to a judicial decision concerning the supply of the currency notes to Ukraine; neither was the UNR’s FSS in Berlin. By order of the new UNR’s Minister of Finance, Baranovsky, The FSS was eliminated and Gershun was relieved for not being able to account for the currency. The premises were shut down and all of the officials were either dismissed or sent to the Ministry of Finance without any allowance<sup>39</sup>.

The Auditing Committee was also shut down soon after the initial incident. To finish the process Baranovsky allowed employees of the committee to work until February 1<sup>st</sup>, 1921, primarily unsupervised<sup>40</sup>. Committee members repeatedly pointed out that they had investigated separate episodes of Suprun’s activities and he and his co-workers were ready to continue their work. They believed they had satisfied all judicial analysis and legal scrutiny.

Nevertheless, the facts disclosed during these investigations exposed the deep rooted nature of the corruption and the resilience of the UNR’s financial agent, Suprun. So much so that he had a de facto emergency and individual powers to manage the public funds of the Ukrainian government. The criminal cooperation of nearly every secret service official, in the, day-to-day sabotage and irre-

sponsible acts is considerable. Other departments of the UNR's FSS activity, not mentioned, in this study, only magnify the corruption and thieveries of public funds being accomplished by the head members of FSS. The intermingling of the FSS with the most influential statesmen, politicians and other organizations of UNR, create quite the conundrum.

Therefore we can conclude that the curtailing of the Auditing Committee's functioning by UNR's Minister of Finance, Baranovsky, was connected not only with military and political community but also with other Ukrainian authorities of that time. Obviously, the organization of the UNR was nearly non-existent or absolutely ineffective. By analysing the Ministry of Finances work in Germany but also Serfdom's activities in Italy and the representatives of the Paris peace conference and others; one sees the hopelessness of Ukraine at this time. A helpless judicial system, conflicts inside several government departments and the actual inability of governmental structures; As well as the usurpation of power by senior ataman, on a scale of which amounted to nothing more than an era of personal greed.

All these factors contributed to the undermining of Ukrainian statehood from the inside and to discredit it in the eyes of the world community. Designated facts only confirm that financial and state-making problems of the UNR, in the time of the Directorate, were more serious than the common "corruption" of Suprun and others of their kind. They were concealed within the initial principles of the UNR's state authority system of organization and corruption.

---

<sup>1</sup> Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie. — Скр. 23 XXIV-10 (17). — К. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Мазела І.* Україна в огні й бурі революції. — К.: Темпора, 2003. — С. 80.

<sup>3</sup> Директорія, Рада Народних Міністрів Української Народної Республіки. Листопад 1918 — листопад 1920 рр.: Документи і матеріали. — Т. 1. — К.: Вид-во імені Олени Теліги, 2006. — С. 188.

<sup>4</sup> Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie. — Скр. 23 XXIV-10 (17). — К. 14а зв.

<sup>5</sup> *Мартос Б.* Українська валюта 1917–1920 років // *Мартос Б., Зозуля Я.* Гроші Української Держави. — Мюнхен: Український технічно-господарський інститут, 1972. — С. 24.

<sup>6</sup> Дивіться: *Гай-Нижник П. П.* Київський період відновленої УНР: фінанси і політика (14 грудня 1918 р. — 5 лютого 1919 р.) // Наукові праці історичного факультету Запорізького державного університету. — Запоріжжя: Просвіта, 2008. — Вип. XXIV: Соціальні та економічні чинники революції і реформ в Україні: проблеми взаємоемплівів. — С.165–175.

<sup>7</sup> *Мазела І.* Україна в огні й бурі революції. — К.: Темпора, 2003. — С. 229.

- <sup>8</sup> *Мартос Б.* Українська валюта 1917–1920 років // *Мартос Б., Зозуля Я.* Гроші Української Держави. — Мюнхен: Український технічно-господарський інститут, 1972. — С. 24.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibidem.*
- <sup>10</sup> Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie. — Скр. 23 XXIV-10 (17). — К. 27.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibidem.*
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 27 зв.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 27 зв. — 28.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 28.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 28 зв.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 29.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 29–29 зв.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 30.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 29–29 зв.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 30.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 29 зв.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibidem.*
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 29.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ковальчук М.* Невідома війна 1919 року: українсько-білогвардійське збройне протистояння. — К.: Темпора, 2006. — С. 457.
- <sup>25</sup> *Мартос Б.* Українська валюта 1917–1920 років // *Мартос Б., Зозуля Я.* Гроші Української Держави. — Мюнхен: Український технічно-господарський інститут, 1972. — С. 25.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibidem.*
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibidem.*
- <sup>28</sup> *Чикаленко Є. Х.* Щоденник, 1919–1920. — Київ; — Нью-Йорк: Вид-во Олени Теліги, 2005. — С. 560; Директорія, Рада Народних Міністрів Української Народної Республіки. Листопад 1918 — листопад 1920 рр.: Документи і матеріали. — Т. 2. — К.: Вид-во імені Олени Теліги, 2006. — С. 694 та ін.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ковальчук М.* Невідома війна 1919 року: українсько-білогвардійське збройне протистояння. — К.: Темпора, 2006. — С. 457.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ріпецький С.* Дата смерті полк. Дмитра Вітовського // *Вільна Україна.* — 1960. — 36. 26. — С. 51–53; *Заклинський М.* Дмитро Вітовський. Громадський діяч, стрілецький ідеолог, вождь Листопадового зриву, секретар військових справ ЗО УНР. — Нью-Йорк: Червона калина, 1067. — С. 117–118; *Веденєєв Д. В.* Вітовський Дмитро Дмитрович // Енциклопедія сучасної України. — К., 2005. — С. 635 та ін.
- <sup>31</sup> Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie. — Скр. 23 XXIV-10 (17). — К. 30–30 зв.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 30.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 99 зв.
- <sup>34</sup> *Мартос Б.* Українська валюта 1917–1920 років // *Мартос Б., Зозуля Я.* Гроші Української Держави. — Мюнхен: Український технічно-господарський інститут, 1972. — С. 25.
- <sup>35</sup> *Мазела І.* Україна в огні й бурі революції. — К.: Темпора, 2003. — С. 301.
- <sup>36</sup> Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie. — Скр. 23 XXIV-10 (17). — К. 28.
- <sup>37</sup> *Мартос Б.* Українська валюта 1917–1920 років // *Мартос Б., Зозуля Я.* Гроші Української Держави. — Мюнхен: Український технічно-господарський інститут, 1972. — С. 24
- <sup>38</sup> Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie. — Скр. 23 XXIV-10 (17). — К. 30 зв.
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 12.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibidem.* — К. 12–12 зв.